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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal comes within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the State
of Utah under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 2002). This Court has jurisdiction over
the matter because the Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 2002).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
A.

Issues for Review and Standard of Review
1.

The Third District Court erred in dismissing Pride Stables' Complaint on the
legal theory of res judicata.
Because the Third District Court's ruling was a conclusion of law, an appellate
court reviews that decision for correctness granting no deference to the District
Court. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989).

2.

The District Court erred in denying Pride Stables' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.
An appellate court reviews the Third District Courts denial of a Motion for
Summary Judgment de novo and all facts presented in the action and all
inferences to be taken therefrom are considered in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah
1991).

3.

The Third District Court erred in refusing to grant Pride Stables' Motion to
Amend Complaint, when all factual allegations supporting the additional
1

Causes of Action were already present in the original Complaint and the record
demonstrates no prejudice to the Defendants.
This Court reviews the District Court's denial of the Motion to Amend under
an abuse of discretion standard. Aurora Credit Services v. Liberty West, 970
P.2d 1273, 1281 (Utah 1998).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This lawsuit involves a golf course known as the Homestead Golf Course in Midway,
Utah.

Plaintiff, Pride Stables ("Pride") is a Utah Limited Partnership.

Defendant,

Homestead Golf Club, Inc., owns the golf course. Defendant Gerald R. Sanders is an
officer, director, shareholder and employee of Homestead Golf Club, Inc.1 Great Inns of the
Rockies, Inc. is the majority stockholder in Homestead Golf Club, Inc. Hereinafter,
Homestead Golf Club, Inc., Sanders and Great Inns of the Rockies, Inc. will be collectively
referred to as either "Homestead" or "Defendants."2
During the late 1980's, Pride filed a Chapter 11 reorganization in Federal Bankruptcy
Court. Thereafter, Pride was approached by Homestead, who proposed to construct a golf
course upon Pride's property. In consideration for Pride's consent to construct ten (10) holes

1

At the time this action was commenced, Sanders was President of Homestead
Golf Club, Inc.
2

The Third District Court entered Orders dismissing the other defendants. (See,
e.g. R. 34, 323-26, 893-95, 920-23, 933-34). Pride does not appeal from those Orders.
2

of the golf course upon its property, Homestead promised to loan Pride $185,000. Pride
needed the loan to prevent its secured creditors from foreclosing. Based upon the promise
of that loan, Pride did not seek financing from other lenders. After construction of the golf
course, Homestead refused to fund the promised loan.
Without the loan promised by Homestead, Pride was unsuccessful in its efforts to
avoid foreclosure. In the ensuing foreclosure sales, Homestead purchased all of the Pride
property upon which the Homestead Golf Course was constructed except for the parcel on
which the 14th hole was constructed. Consequently, Homestead brought an adversary
proceeding before the Federal Bankruptcy Court ("Federal Action") to obtain a ruling that
Pride had granted it a license to use the 14th hole property for construction and operation of
a golf course. Pride attempted to litigate all of its claims against Homestead in the Federal
Action. But, based upon a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Homestead obtained an Order
from the Federal Bankruptcy Court dismissing all of Pride's claims related to property other
than the 14th hole parcel. Subject matter jurisdiction did not exist as to the non-14th Hole
Property because it was no longer owned by Pride due to foreclosure.
In the Federal Action, Homestead admitted that it had promised to loan Pride
$185,000 in exchange for Pride's consent to construction and operation of the golf course.
Homestead argued, however, that the promised loan only applied to the property other than
the 14th hole parcel. Throughout the 1990's, the Federal Action was vigorously litigated.
There were two trials and multiple appeals, including a decision by the Tenth Circuit in
Homestead Golf Club, Inc. v. Pride Stables, 224 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2000), affirming the
3

Federal District Court's ruling that Homestead had promised a loan of $ 185,000 to Pride, and
that Pride had relied upon that loan by giving Homestead permission to construct its golf
course but that the promise of a loan was too indefinite to be enforced as an express contract.
The Tenth Circuit specifically stated that its decision did not apply to the non-14th hole
property. The Tenth Circuit also noted that while no express contract existed with respect
to the 14th Hole Property, Pride might have been entitled to equitable relief under implied
contract or promissory estoppel. But the Tenth Circuit refused to consider those alternatives
to an express contract because they had not been raised before the Federal Bankruptcy Court
or Federal District Court.
While the Federal Action was proceeding, Pride commenced the instant lawsuit
("State Action") against Homestead. Despite the Tenth Circuit's statement that its decision
did not apply to or affect the non-14th hole property, Homestead moved for summary
judgment before the Third District Court on the basis of the Federal Action. Homestead
argued that the State Action was barred under the doctrine of res judicata. The Third District
Court granted Homestead's Motion. As a result of the Third District Court's decision,
Homestead has a golf course and Pride has nothing.
B.

PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Pride filed its Complaint in the "State Action" on December 14, 1989. (R. 1). The
case remained active until the end of 1991 when the parties tacitly entered into a stand still
agreement in order to concentrate on pursuing their respective claims in the "Federal

4

Action." The Federal Bankruptcy Court had no jurisdiction over the property involved in the
State Action.
After the Federal Action was finally resolved in 2000, Pride filed a. Motion for Leave
to Amend its Complaint in 2001. The Third District Court denied that Motion. (R. 1204).
Subsequently, Homestead filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Pride filed a CrossMotion for Partial Summary Judgment. The Third District Court granted Homestead's
Motion based upon the doctrine of res judicata but it denied Pride's Cross-Motion. (R.
1506). Pride then filed its Notice of Appeal. (R. 1517).
C.

MATERIAL FACTS

Many of the following facts are taken from the record in the Federal Action including
the Tenth Circuit Court's decision reported at Homestead Golf Club, Inc. v. Pride Stables,
224 F.3d 1195, 1198-99 (10th Or. 2000). Pride submits that res judicata applies to many of
the findings made in the Federal Action and affirmed by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Specifically, findings related to the fact that Homestead did promise the $185,000 loan to
Pride in exchange for Pride's consent and assistance in construction of the golf course. A
copy of the Tenth Circuit's opinion is included in the Addendum.
Homestead was organized to construct a golf course in Midway, Utah. Homestead,
224 F. 3d at 1198. Pride Stables owned a 50% interest in the two parcels of property upon
which 10 holes of the golf course were to be built. The first parcel is known as the "14th
Hole Property"'and was the subject of the Federal Action. Id. The second parcel was co-

5

owned by Cal Clark and is known as the "Clark-Pride Property." Id. The Clark-Pride
Property is the parcel involved in the State Action.
In February of 1987, Homestead approached Pride to obtain the right to use portions
of the Clark-Pride Property and the 14th Hole Property for the construction and operation
of a golf course. Id. By Spring 1988, however, Pride was in default on loans secured by the
Clark-Pride Property. Pride filed a petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in
order to forestall foreclosure and was pursuing forbearance agreements with its creditors.
(Id; R. 1336). Homestead's Vice President, Lem Stroud, knew that the Clark-Pride
Property was encumbered by trust deeds and other liens. Stroud likewise knew that Pride
would need to make payments on these encumbrances during the course of construction of
the golf course in order to avoid foreclosure.

Stroud also encouraged Pride to seek

forbearance agreements from its creditors. (R. 1336, 1399).
In late February of 1988, Homestead represented to Pride in writing that the
construction and operation of the proposed golf course on a portion of Pride's property
would greatly increase the value of the remaining Pride property adjacent to the golf course.
Homestead represented that if the golf course were constructed the value of Pride's real
property adjoining the golf course would increase in value from approximately $150,000 to
more than $6 million. (R. 1366-67).
Homestead's President, Sanders, told Pride that it was important for Homestead to get
a Letter of Commitment from Pride authorizing Homestead's construction of the golf course
upon Pride's property. Homestead needed that Letter of Commitment in order to begin the
6

construction of its golf course. The City of Midway, Utah required that Letter before it
would issue a building permit for the golf course. (R. 1407). In return for the promised loan
of $185,000, Homestead requested Pride to sign this Letter of Commitment? In reliance
upon those representations, Pride agreed to let Homestead use a portion of its property for
the construction and operation of a golf course. {Homestead, 224 F.3d at 1198; R. 1367,
1399). In the Federal Action, the parties stipulated in the Pretrial Order to the following
incontroverted fact: "Plaintiff [Homestead] and Defendant [Pride Stables] orally agreed
that Plaintiff would lend Defendant the sum of $185,000 so that Defendant could make
payment to certain of its secured creditors." (R. 1352). During the course of the Federal
Action, Homestead took the position that this promise to loan Pride $185,000 related only
to the Clark-Pride Property. Homestead, 224 F.3d at 1201.
As a result of these promises, on June 15, 1988, Pride and the other co-owner of the
Clark-Pride Property signed the Letter of Commitment prepared by Homestead's attorney
allowing Homestead to begin construction of the golf course. (Homestead, 224 F.3d at 1198;
R. 846-48, 857,1398-1403). Based upon that Letter of Commitment, the City of Midway,
Utah granted a permit and Homestead began construction. (Homestead, 224 F.3d at 1198;

3

Homestead's Vice President, Stroud, who negotiated on behalf of Homestead,
admitted in latter depositions that he felt he owed a fiduciary duty to Pride and that he
had represented to Pride that if Pride would allow Homestead to use its property, Pride
would be "morally, legally and otherwise protected in their dealings." (R. 1404-07).
Neither Stroud nor Homestead honored that commitment, however.
7

R. 1400).4 In granting that permit for construction of the golf course, the City of Midway's
planning commission imposed as a condition upon Homestead that all necessary easement
and legal agreements from participating property owners be obtained and submitted to the
City Planner prior to any construction being started.
Following its receipt of that Letter of Commitmentfromthe Clark-Pride Property
owners, Homestead issued a check in the sum of $5,000 to one of Pride's secured creditors
for the purpose of forestalling foreclosure on a portion of the Clark-Pride Property. (R.
1353,1368). The Federal Bankruptcy Court specifically found that this money represented
part of the loan which Homestead had agreed to make to Pride. (Id). After Homestead
substantially completed the construction of a golf course, it refused to make the balance of
the agreed loan unless Pride obtained the subordination of the loans of its secured creditors.
Specifically, Homestead would not provide the $180,000 loan balance to Pride unless Pride
obtained agreements from its secured creditors on the Clark-Pride Property to subordinate
their claims to those of Homestead. (Homestead, 224 F.3d at 1198; R. 1370, 1395).
The issue of subordination was the subject of extensive litigation in the Federal
Action and the Federal Bankruptcy Court found that Homestead knew Pride was dependent
upon the loan to obtain forbearance from its creditors and that Homestead's failure to fund
the agreed loan would result and did result in Pride's loss of the property. (R. 1370). The
Federal Bankruptcy Court expressly found that Homestead had induced Pride to permit
4

Construction of the golf course resulted in significant destruction of Pride's
property. (R. 858).
8

construction of the golf course by representing it would loan Pride $185,000 to enable Pride
to avoid foreclosure by its secured creditors and that Pride had reasonably relied upon that
representation by executing the Letter of Commitment. (R. 1372). It is also undisputed that
in reliance upon the promised loan from Homestead, Pride never sought an alternative source
of funding for the forbearance agreements with its secured creditors. (R. 1400).
The Federal Bankruptcy Court went on to conclude that the loan agreement between
Homestead and Pride did not require Pride to obtain subordination of its other secured
creditors to Homestead's loan and that the requirement of subordination was not part of the
loan agreement. (R. 1369 and 1373). The Federal Bankruptcy Court also specifically found
that despite the fact that it was not required to do so under the original agreement between
the parties, Pride attempted in good faith to obtain subordination from its creditors but was
unsuccessful. Id.
The Federal B ankruptcy Court concluded, as a matter of law, that Homestead's refusal
to make the promised loan to Pride without the subordination of Pride's secured creditors
was an anticipatory repudiation of the loan agreement between them. (R. 1373). The Federal
District Court affirmed the Federal Bankruptcy Court on this issue (R. 1396). The Federal
District Court was in turn affirmed by the Tenth Circuit. Homestead, 224 F.3d at 1198.
In its Memorandum, Opinion and Order affirming the Federal Bankruptcy Court's
decision, the Federal District Court found that Homestead knew Pride's creditors would not
agree to subordinate. The District Court likewise found that "by suggesting that the loan
agreement could go ahead only if Pride obtained subordination agreements of all the lien
9

holders, including Davis County Bank - a creditor that in no uncertain terms stated it
would not subordinate - HGC [Homestead] eflfectively created an impossibility of
performance." (R. 1395). Based upon its review of the record, the Federal District Court
affirmed the Federal Bankruptcy Court's decision that Homestead had anticipatorily
repudiated its promise of a $185,000 loan to Pride with respect to the demand for
subordination: "HGC [Homestead] was requesting (1) a performance it was not entitled
to under the agreement; and (2) a performance HGC knew would be impossible for
Pride to accomplish." (R. 1396). The Federal District Court also found that there was no
express contract between the parties, which was another basis for affirming the Federal
Bankruptcy Court. (R. 1386).
After foreclosure, Homestead purchased from Pride's creditors those portions of the
Clark-Pride Property upon which its golf course was constructed.

Homestead then

commenced the Federal Action to obtain the 14th Hole Property. When Homestead
commenced the Federal Action, Pride attempted to litigate all of the issues involving the golf
course, both the 14th Hole Property and the Clark-Pride Property. Pride attempted to do this
by way of a Counterclaim. However, Homestead and other parties in the Federal Action
moved to dismiss the Counterclaim and the Federal Bankruptcy Court granted ih^t Motion.
Pride's Counterclaim with respect to the Clark-Pride Property was dismissed without
prejudice based upon a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (R. 1414-18).

10

The Federal Bankruptcy Court concluded that subject matter jurisdiction did not exist
over the Clark-Pride Property claims because Pride no longer owned this land. Pride's
creditors had foreclosed upon the Clark-Pride Property, which meant that Pride's claims
related to this land did not arise under the Federal Bankruptcy Code nor did they involve a
core proceeding arising under Federal Bankruptcy Code. Due to the lack of subject matter
jurisdiction over the Clark-Pride Property, the Tenth Circuit explicitly stated that its decision
related only to the 14th Hole Property and "[did] not preclude any pending or future
actions involving claims relevant only to the Clark-Pride Property" Homestead, 224 F.
3d at 1201 n. 7.
The Federal Action was concluded on September 12, 2000, when the Tenth Circuit
issued its final decision. Pride filed its Motion to Amend in the State Action approximately
ore year later. (R. 975). This proposed Amended Complaint stated Causes of Action for
breach of implied contract based upon part performance, promissory estoppel, intentional
interference with economic relations, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and fraud. (R. 978-97). These Causes of Action were all either explicitly set forth
in Pride's original Complaint, or were fully supported by Pride's allegations in its original
Complaint. (R. 1-23, 978-97).
Specifically, in its Complaint, Pride made the following allegations:
On or about March 9,1988, Plaintiff informed Defendants (other than Valley)
that, as a condition precedent to granting the permission requested by said
Defendants to build the said Golf Course on portions of Plaintiff s property,
Plaintiff needed sufficient funds to obtain the forbearance of Valley and other
secured creditors from foreclosure during a period of two years or more during
11

the construction of the golf course and pending the development and sale of
Plaintiffs properties adjoining the proposed golf course.
* * *

During May and June of 1988, in reliance upon the representation of
Defendants (other than Valley) that the loan of $185,000 would be made
promptly, Plaintiff orally agreed with said Defendants to grant Homestead
a license to construct a large portion of its proposed golf course upon
portions of Plaintiff's properties in consideration of the said loan.
* * *

Based upon the said oral agreements . . . and in partial performance of said
oral agreement, Plaintiffs' general partner executed a letter addressed to
Midway City, Utah in the form prepared and requested by said Defendants
. . . to assist him in obtaining a permitfromthe City of Midway for the
construction of the said golf course, and Defendants did in fact use that
letter to obtain a building permit and promptly thereafter began the
construction of the golf course.
* * *

[Defendants have failed and refused to perform the oral agreement to
make the said loan and to execute the proposed written agreement and
have failed and refused to provide Plaintiff with any part of said loan save
and except for the sum of $5,000 which was advanced to Plaintiffs on or
about July 7,1988.
* # *

Notwithstanding the aforesaid . . . breach of the oral agreement by said
Defendants... Defendants proceeded to occupy portions of Plaintiffs9 lands
and have entered into a series of contracts with third persons for
construction work and materials and have induced and directed third
persons to enter upon Plaintiffs9 land and to construct substantial portions
of Defendants9 proposed golf course on Plaintiffs' land and have cut down
trees, removed topsoil, created road, dug trenches, removed fences, recontoured land, installed signs and utilized the property for the storage
and use of construction equipment and materials. Said Defendants
fraudulently induced Plaintiffs to take no immediate legal action against such
intrusions and use of Plaintiffs' property by continuing to negotiate with
12

Plaintiffs and by representing that their promises would be performed, but in
fact said Defendants did not intend to perform the oral contract or to execute
and perform the proposed written contract.
# # *

By reason of the foregoing, Defendants . • • have occupied and used large
portions of Plaintiffs' properties without paying the agreed consideration,
have damaged the property and, by reason of withholding the promised
funds, have denied Plaintiff the ability to obtain a forbearance of its
secured creditors in order to preclude foreclosure of the deeds of trust
applicable to Plaintiffs' lands.
# * *

By reason of the foregoing Plaintiff was unable to provide its secured
creditors with consideration for the forbearance of their rights to foreclose
and Valley, despite its previous agreement to forebear if furnished
consideration from the funds to be loaned by Defendant to Plaintiff, has
foreclosed and purchased substantial portions of Plaintiff's property at
foreclosure sales.
(R. 5-8)(emphasis added).5 The foregoing allegations state claims for breach of implied
contract and promissory estoppel.
In its opinion, the Tenth Circuit recognized that the doctrines of promissary estoppel
and partial performance "might allow a remedy where no formal contract exists." But the
Tenth Circuit did not apply either doctrine because "Pride... did not advance arguments
based upon these theories until its Reply Brief..."

Homestead, 224 F. 3d at 1202 fn. 9.

However, despite that acknowledgmentfromthe Tenth Circuit and holding that its decision
only applied to the 14th Hole Property, the Third District Court denied Pride's Motion to

5

Although not expressly identified as such, these allegations establish a claim for
partial performance and promissory estoppel. See infra discussion at page 25.
13

Amend its Complaint The Third District Court denied Pride's Motion to Amend based upon
the doctrine of res judicata and alleged prejudice to the Defendants. (R. 1204, 1212).
Homestead filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 1322). Pride filed a CrossMotion for Partial Summary Judgment on its First and Eighth Causes ofAction to establish
liability on the part of Homestead as to these claims, leaving only damages to be tried. (R.
1419). The Third District Court denied Pride's Cross-Motion and granted Homestead's
Motion based upon res judicata. (R. 1502-1511). Pride appealed from the decisions of the
Third District Court. (R. 1517).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse the decision of the Third District Court and remand the case
for further proceedings because the Third District Court erred in concluding that res judicata
operated to bar Pride's Causes of Action against Homestead. Res Judicata does not apply
to this case because the Courts in the Federal Action on which Homestead bases its argument
of res judicata never had subject matter jurisdiction over the Clark-Pride Property. Further,
the Federal Bankruptcy Court, Federal District Court and Tenth Circuit Court in the Federal
Action never considered the arguments advanced by Pride in this State Action case, namely
equitable alternatives for enforcing contracts not based on the existence of an express formal
contract.
The Third District Court erred, too, by failing to grant Pride's Cross-Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment. The Courts in the Federal Action have made all the factual
predicate determinations that Homestead breached an implied contract based upon part
14

performance and that Pride is entitled to recovery on the basis of promissory estoppel.
Because these factual determinations have already been made, Pride was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law on the liability portion of those implied contract and promissory estoppel
claims, leaving only damages for trial.
Finally, the District Court abused its discretion by refusing Pride leave to amend its
Complaint. The Third District Court incorrectly concluded that res judicata barred the
claims made by Pride in the proposed Amended Complaint. Further, the record does not
support the Third District Court's statement that Homestead would be prejudiced by the
Amended Complaint. Hence, the Third District Court's denial of Pride's Motion was an
abuse of discretion.
ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
RES JUDICATA OPERATED TO BAR PRIDE'S CLAIMS AGAINST
DEFENDANTS
The Third District Court incorrectly concluded that Pride's Causes of Action for
breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and fraud were
barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

In its Memorandum Decision, the Third District

Court stated:
The plaintiffs first cause of action for breach of contract and eighth
cause of action for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
which depends on an enforceable contract, are based upon the same agreement
that the 10th Circuit Court ruled was never completed by the parties.
Therefore, it is clear that the 10th Circuit Court ruling that there was no
agreement between the parties bars these causes of action. Although plaintiff
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argues that its causes of action included claims based upon part performance
and promissory estoppel, the plaintiff has not pled them.
As to plaintiff's ninth cause of action for fraud, the plaintiff alleges
that defendants' promise to loan money to plaintiff was fraudulent, in that
defendants had no intention of making the loan at the time they agreed to
do so.6 While an enforceable contract is not required for an action in fraud,
the plaintiffs fraud claim is based upon the defendants' failure to perform
under the alleged agreement which was addressed by the 10th Circuit opinion.
The plaintiffs fraud claim is asserted on the basis that the parties had an
agreement. It appears clear that one cannot base a fraud claim on a failure to
perform an agreement where the court has found no agreement exists. Based
upon that, the plaintiff is barred by die res judicata effect of the 10th Circuit
opinion as to its fraud claim as well.
(R. 1502-03)(emphasis added). The Third District Court incorrectly applied the doctrine.
"The doctrine of res judicata has two branches, claim preclusion and issue
preclusion." PGM, Inc. v. Westchester Inv. Partners, Ltd, 2000 UT App 2014, 995 P.2d
1252 at 1254. The Third District Court failed to enunciate which of the two branches it
applied to the facts of this case and, accordingly, it failed to adequately address the separate
elements of each branch. Therefore, Pride will discuss each branch. For issue preclusion
to apply, the party advocating application of the doctrine must prove the following:
First the issue in both cases must be identical. Second, the judgment must be
final with respect to that issue. Third, the issue must have been fully, fairly,
and completely litigated in the first action. Fourth, the party who is
precluded from litigating the issue must be either a party to the first action or
a privy of a party.
6

It is clear from this language that the Third District Court recognized that the
basis of Pride's fraud claim was not the existence of a contract between Pride and
Homestead, but Homestead's fraudulent promise to loan money in exchange for Pride's
assistance in the construction and operation of the golf course. The significance of this
recognition is discussed in more detail infra at page 23.
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Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 250 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added).
For claim preclusion to apply, the party advocating application of the doctrine must
prove the following:
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the
claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit
or must be one that could and should have been raised in the first action.
Third the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
Id. at 247 (emphasis added). Neither issue preclusion nor claim preclusion applies to the
facts of this case because the issues involved in the State Action were not fully and fairly
litigated in the Federal Action. More importantly, because the Federal Bankruptcy Court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Clark-Pride Property, the issues in the State
Action related to that property could not have been litigated in the Federal Action.
Three undisputed facts exist which undermine the Third District Court's decision
regarding res judicata: (1) Pride attempted to fully litigate the case in the Federal Action,
however, based upon iht Motion of Defendants the Federal Bankruptcy Court refused to hear
claims regarding the Clark-Pride Property for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and, thus,
the Federal Courts only determined the rights of the parties regarding the 14th Hole Property;
Homestead Golf Club, 224 F.3d at 1201 n.7; (2) the Federal Action did not address issues
concerning detrimental reliance or partial performance Id. at 1202 n.9; and (3) the Federal
Action did not resolve any issues surrounding Pride's allegations of fraud against the
Defendants. Id. at 1202-03. These undisputed facts demonstrate that the issues regarding
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the Clark-Pride Property were not fully and fairly litigated in the Federal Action, nor could
they have been litigated.
A.

Pride Was Not Allowed to Litigate All Issues Regarding the Clark-Pride
Property in the Federal Action.

Pride made an effort to litigate all of the issues involving the Homestead Golf Course
Property in the Federal Action (both the Hole-14 Property and the Clark-Pride Property) by
way of Counterclaim. However, Homestead moved to dismiss the Counterclaim. The
Federal Bankruptcy Court granted that Motion and dismissed Pride's Counterclaim with
respect to the Clark-Pride Property "without prejudice" based upon the lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. (R. 1414-18). The Federal Bankruptcy Court concluded that subject
matter jurisdiction did not exist over the Clark-Pride Property claims because Pride no
longer owned this land. Pride's creditors had foreclosed upon the Clark-Pride Property,
which meant that Pride's claims related to this land did not arise under the Federal
Bankruptcy Code nor did they involve a core proceeding arising under Federal Bankruptcy
Code. Therefore, during the entire course of the Federal Action, the Clark-Pride Property
was outside the purview of the Federal Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction and no decisions
made in the Federal Action effected the Clark Pride Property. See e.g. United States v. 51
Pieces of Real Estate Property Roswell, New Mexico, 17 F.3d 1306, 1309 (10th Cir. 1994)
(concluding that orders and judgments entered with respect to property over which a court
has no subject matter jurisdiction are void and unenforceable).

18

The Tenth Circuit expressly recognized this fact when it stated: "Because the scope
of the complaint and subsequent finding of the bankruptcy court are limited to the
fourteenth hole property, we do not address whether the parties entered into an
agreement or contract relative to the Clark-Pride property- Our decision therefore does
not preclude any pending or future actions involving claims relevant only to the ClarkPride property." Homestead Golf Club, 224 F.3d at 1201 n.7. Thus, not only did Pride not
have an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate issues related to the Clark-Pride Property, it
was affirmatively prevented from doing so, in large part due to Homestead's successful
Motion to Dismiss Pride's Counterclaim. For this reason, a critical element of both branches
of res judicata is missing (ie. opportunity to fully and fairly litigate) and Pride should be
allowed to pursue its claims in reference to the Clark-Pride Property.
1.

Homestead's Claims of Res Judicata Are Barred by Judicial
Estoppel.

Homestead argued with success in the Federal Action that the Federal Bankruptcy
Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the Clark-Pride Property.

Since

Homestead prevailed on that Motion, it cannot now claim that Pride had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate its claims concerning that property in the Federal Action. Having
made and prevailed on that Motion, Homestead is judicially estopped from asserting in this
State Action that Pride's Clark-Pride Property claims were tried or should have been tried
in the Federal Action.

In other words, since the Federal Bankruptcy Court granted

Homestead's Motion to Dismiss in the Federal Action, Homestead is judicially estopped
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from asserting the Affirmative Defense of res judicata in the State Action. See Condas v.
Condas, 618 P.2d 491, 496 (Utah 1980) (holding that "it is well settled that a party who
has taken a position in a prior litigation and has obtained relief on the basis of it cannot
maintain the opposite position in another action").
B.

Pride's Claims for Breach of Implied Contract Based upon Part
Performance and Promissory Estoppel Are Not Barred by Res Judicata
Because the Federal Action Did Not Address Those Causes of Action.

Defendants farther claim that Pride's Causes of Action are barred by res judicata
because the facts underlying both the 14th Hole Property and the Clark-Pride Property are
similar, if not identical. However, the record reveals that the claims set forth by Pride in the
State Action were not resolved in the Federal Action. As stated above, the Tenth Circuit
expressly stated that its ruling did not apply to the Clark-Pride Property and that the parties
were free to pursue Causes of Action concerning that property in other forums. Furthermore,
the Tenth Circuit made clear that it was presented solely with the question of whether there
was an express contract between the parties. The Tenth Circuit did not evaluate or determine
whether alternatives to an express contract, such as detrimental reliance and/or part
performance, would provide a remedy to Pride, particularly as to the Clark-Pride Property,
because those issues were not before the Court. Specifically, the Tenth Circuit stated:
We do not address the merits of Pride's reply brief contention that it is entitled
to relief pursuant to the doctrines enunciated in Restatement (Second) of
Contracts §§ 34 and 69(2) (1979). See Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994
F.2d 716, 724 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that issues raised for the first time in
the reply brief will not be considered). Ordinarily, detrimental reliance
might allow a remedy where no formal contract exists, or, alternatively,
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partial performance might support a finding of an enforceable contract.
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 34 (1979). Pride, however, did not
advance arguments based on these theories until its reply brief, although it did
place in play the doctrinally independent concept of equitable estoppel.
Homestead Golf Club, 224 F.3d at 1202 n.9 (emphasis added).
The Tenth Circuit thus recognized that had the issues of detrimental reliance
(promissory estoppel) and part performance been before it, those doctrines may have
provided a remedy as to the 14th Hole Property despite its conclusions that no "formal
contract" existed. But, because the Clark-Pride Property was not within the jurisdiction of
the Tenth Circuit and because the Tenth Circuit did not determine whether issues of part
performance or detrimental reliance created an enforceable "contract" or promise between
the parties, neither branch of res judicata applied to bar the Third District Court from
resolving these issues.7
1.

The Issues of Part Performance and Promissory Estoppel Were
Appropriately Pled in the Complaint

The Third District Court concluded that the issues of part performance and
detrimental reliance were not appropriately before it and as such it based its decision solely
7

There is one additional fact that makes the cases dissimilar. Specifically, in the
Federal Action, Homestead claimed that the loan agreement or contract related only to
the Clark-Pride Property, while Pride contended that the loan covered both parcels of
property. Homestead, 224 F.3d at 1200 ("HGC [Homestead] claims the loan related
only to the Clark-Pride Property, but Pride alleges the loan was supported by HGC's
USA of both the Clark-Pride and the 14-Hole Properties"). The United States District
Court accepted Homestead's contention about the loan agreement relating solely to the
Clark-Pride Property and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. This fact alone is sufficient to
demonstrate that the facts underlying this action differ enough from the Federal Action
that res judicata does not apply.
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on whether an actual formal contract existed between the parties, the issue which was
decided in the Federal Action. However, a careful reading of the original Complaint in this
matter (R. 1-32), reveals that the facts supporting these Causes of Action were included in
the Complaint and, therefore, should have been discussed and reviewed by the district court.
Pride does not dispute that it cannot in this action pursue a theory that there was an express
formal contract between the parties. This would be subject to res judicata since the parties
agree that the 14th Hole Property and the Clark-Pride Property were both part of the same
negotiations and transactions. However, Pride's allegations in its Complaint go beyond
merely alleging the creation of an express formal contract, they discuss the creation of a
contract through part performance or alternatively the enforceability of a promise through
promissory estoppel. When Pride's First Cause of Action for breach of contract and its
Eighth Cause of Action for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are
reviewed under that lens, it becomes apparent that the Tenth Circuit opinion has no effect
on those Causes of Action and they would not be subject to res judicata.
C.

The District Court Erred in Determining That Res Judicata Applied to
Pride's Fraud Claim.

Similarly, the Third District Court incorrectly concluded that res judicata operated
to bar Pride's claim for fraud. The District Court based its decision on the mistaken assertion
that the basis of the claim was that the "parties had an agreement" (R. 1503), and because
there was no agreement, as concluded in the Federal Action, the fraud claim was barred by
res judicata. Such a decision takes a far too limited view of Pride's Complaint.
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Pride based its Cause of Action for fraud on the fact that there is evidence of
Homestead's intent not to honor the promise of a loan to Pride when Homestead knew not
orfy that Pride was relying upon that loan but that Pride would lose its property to
foreclosure if the loan was not made. Homestead's intent in this matter is revealed by the
Letter of Commitment. Homestead knew prior to obtaining that Letter of Commitment from
Pride that Pride's creditors would not subordinate. (R. 1337, 1412-13). Subordination was
not part of the promise to loan which Homestead made to Pride. Nevertheless, after
obtaining the Letter of Commitment to allow it to construct the golf course, Homestead
imposed the condition of subordination upon Pride, knowing that it would be impossible for
Pride to perform. This would certainly support a claim of fraud against Homestead on behalf
of Pride since under Utah law, a statement of a future intention is actionable if a fraudulent
intention existed at the time the deceitful statement was made. See Berkeley Bank v. Meibos,
607 P.2d 798, 805 (Utah 1980).
Furthermore, an enforceable contract is not required to support a fraud claim in Utah.
Under Utah law, any promise accompanied by present intention not to perform, made for
purpose of deceiving the promisee, thereby inducing him to act where otherwise he would
not have done so and by virtue of which he parts with his money or some other property, is
actionable deceit. Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Ventura Number One, 645 P.2d 608, 611
(Utah 1982). In this case, it was fraud based upon the promise of a loan which Pride seeks
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to litigate, not fraud based upon an actual enforceable agreement between the parties.8
Therefore, the Third District Court incorrectly concluded that res judicata barred Pride's
fraud claim.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING PRIDE'S CROSSMOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS BREACH
OF CONTRACT CLAIMS
In concluding that res judicata operated to bar Pride's Cause of Action in this case,
the Third District Court also denied Pride's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
Because res judicata did not apply the Third District Court should have considered and
granted Pride's Motion. Pride was entitled to partial summary judgment under sections 34
and 69(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts as well as under the theory of promissory
estoppel. Both parties admit and the Federal Bankruptcy Court found that Homestead agreed
to loan Pride $185,000 in exchange for Pride allowing Homestead to build a golf course on
its land. The Pretrial Order entered in the Federal Action even lists as an incontroverted
fact that "on or about May 9,1988 Plaintiff [HGC] and Defendant [Pride] oraUy agreed
that Plaintiff would lend Defendant the sum of $185,000 so that Defendant could make
payment to certain of its secured creditors."9 (Emphasis added.")- It is undisputed that this

8

As previously noted, the Third District Court's Memorandum Decision
acknowledges that Pride's fraud claim was based upon the promise of a loan which
Homestead had no intention of honoring. See supra at page 16.
9

According to the Tenth Circuit, Homestead claimed that the loan agreement or
contract related only to the Clark-Pride Property, while Pride contended that the loan
covered both parcels of property. Homestead, 224 F.3d at 1200
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promise was made. The Tenth Circuit opinion also makes clear that Homestead gave Pride
a check in the amount of $5,000 in furtherance of this promise/agreement. Homestead Golf
Club, 224 F.3d at 1198. It is undisputed, too, that Pride relied upon Homestead's promise
of a $185,000 loan by executing the Letter of Commitment, permitting Homestead to
construct its golf course upon portions of Pride's property, and by not seeking another source
of financing to fund the forbearance agreements it was attempting to negotiate with creditors.
Finally, it is also undisputed that Homestead refused to loan Pride the money at the critical
point in its negotiations with creditors; that creditors foreclosed upon the Clark-Pride
Property; and that Homestead purchased, as it intended, portions of the Clark-Pride Property
from those foreclosing creditors. Under these undisputed or already established facts, Pride
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Homestead's promise to loan Pride the money is enforceable as an implied contract.10
An implied contract is found when there is no express contract but the conduct of the parties
is such that the law implies an enforceable contract. Consequently, a finding that there is no
express contract is not inconsistent with formation of a contract through conduct of the
parties. SeeBarwickPacific Carpet Co. v. KamHawaii Construction Inc., 630P.2d 638,641
(Hawaii App. 1981). See also Kimball Elevator Co. v. Elevator Supplies Co., 272P .2d 583,
584 (Utah 1954) (recognizing the principle of contract formation through conduct of the

10

As detailed above, the Tenth Circuit's decision that the promise of a loan to
Pride was too indefinite to be enforced as an express contract would not be a bar to
Pride's pursuit of and recovery under an implied contract claim against Homestead
related to the Clark-Pride Property.
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parties). Even the Tenth Circuit Court recognized that Sections 34 and 69(2) of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts may have provided Pride with an alternative remedy to
a finding of an express contract. Homestead Golf Club, 224 F.3d at 1202 n.9. Pursuant to
these sections of the Restatement, Pride is entitled to a ruling that an implied contract based
upon reliance and part performance existed between the parties and that Homestead breached
that agreement by its anticipatory repudiation.
Section 34 provides that "part performance on an agreement may remove uncertainty
and establish that a contract enforceable as a bargain has been formed" and that "action in
reliance on an agreement may make a contractual remedy appropriate even though
uncertainty is not removed." (Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 34). Section 34 is, in
other words, a gap-filling provision employed when the terms of the agreement are too
indefinite to constitute an express contract as in this case. See Lo Bosco v. Kure Engineering
ltd., 891 F. Supp. 1020, 1026 (D.N.J. 1995).
In the instant case., Pride fully performed by allowing Homestead to construct and
operate its golf course on the Clark-Pride Property and, most important of all, by signing the
Letter of Commitment, without which Homestead could never have constructed its golf
course. That an implied contract exists in this instance is further shown by the fact that after
receipt of the Letter of Commitment, Homestead paid $5,000 to prevent one of Pride's
creditors from foreclosing upon a portion of the Clark-Pride Property and by the position
Homestead took in the Federal Action that its promise of a loan related solely to the ClarkPride Property.
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Section 69(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts likewise triggers an implied
contract. This section provides that:
An offeree who does any act inconsistent with the offerer's
ownership of offered property is bound in accordance with the
offered terms unless they are manifestly unreasonable. . .
(Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 69(2)). The same facts that would sustain an implied
contract under Section 34 of the Restatement, would do so under Section 69(2). In addition,
Homestead took possession of Pride's property and did so pursuant to a promise that it would
loan $185,000 to Pride so that Pride could avoid foreclosure. Pride respectfully submits,
therefore, that Homestead's promise of a loan is enforceable under Section 69(2) of the
Restatement.11 See Russel v. Texas Co., 238 F.2d 636, 642 (9th Cir. 1956) (recognizing that
exercise or dominion over the thing offered constitutes acceptance); Crouch v. Marrs, 430
P.2d 204,209 (Kan. 1967) (same); Warrior Constructors, Inc., v. Small Business Investment
Co. of Houston, 536 S.W.2d 382, 386 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (same).
Pride is also entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its claim for promissory
estoppel. As with the part performance theory, the Tenth Circuit likewise noted that
Homestead's promise of funding might be enforceable under a promissory estoppel or

11

If the Court enforces Homestead's promise of a loan to Pride as an implied
contract, then Homestead clearly breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing that is the basis of Pride's Eighth Cause of Action. In fact, the Federal District
Court specifically found that by refusing to loan Pride the money without subordination
agreements from Pride's secured creditors, "HGC [Homestead] effectively created the
impossibility of performance." (R. 1395). Pride respectfully submits that such a finding
is, as a matter of law, a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
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detrimental alliance theory based upon Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
But like the other possible Restatement remedies, Section 90 was not considered by the
Tenth Circuit because (with respect to the 14th Hole Property) it had not been timely raised
by Pride. As previously noted, however, that does not preclude Pride's assertion of
detrimental reliance as to the Clark-Pride Property since that property was not before the
Federal Bankruptcy Court.
This fact is significant because promissory estoppel is only available as a remedy in
the absence of an otherwise enforceable contract. See Scott Co. ofCal v. MK-Ferguson Co.,
832 P.2d 1000,1003 (Colo. App. 1991). See also Easton v. Wycojf, 295 P.2d 332,334 (Utah
1956) (promissory estoppel appropriate when agreement lacks consideration and is therefore
not a binding contract). In other words, it takes a finding of no express contract to trigger
a claim for promissory estoppel.
The purpose of promissory estoppel is to enable courts to enforce contract-like
promises made unenforceable by technical defects or defenses. See Brady v. State, 965 P.2d
1,10 (Alaska 1998). The key to this non-contractual claim is a promise on which a party has
relied to his or her its detriment. The elements of promissory estoppel are (1) a promise that
the promissor reasonably expects will induce reliance, (2) reasonable reliance inducing
action or forbearance by promisee, and (3) detriment to the promisee. See Prows v. State,
822 P. 2d 764, 768-69 (Utah 1991). All such elements of promissory estoppel were pled in
Pride's First Cause of Action. Further, all such elements were found in the Federal Action.
Specifically, the facts elicited in the parties' stipulation established that Homestead promised
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to loan Pride $185,000. The Tenth Circuit opinion also establishes that Pride relied on this
promise to its detriment. Under these undisputed facts, even if the Court finds there was no
implied contract between the parties, Pride is still entitled to a partial summary judgment
establishing Homestead's liability for breach of a promise of funding, leaving only damages
for trial. See First National Bank of Logan Sport v. Logan Manufacturing Co., Inc., 577
N.E.2d 949 (Ind. 1991)(even though not enforceable as an express contract, promise of a
loan was enforceable under doctrine of promissory estoppel). For these reasons the Third
District Court erred in denying Pride's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
PRIDE'S MOTION TO AMEND ITS COMPLAINT WHEN ALL THE
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS SUPPORTING THE SUPPLEMENTAL
CAUSES OF ACTION WERE PLED IN THE COMPLAINT
The Third District Court abused its discretion when it refused to allow Pride to amend
its Complaint. When a plaintiff presents a court with a Motion for Leave to Amend its
Complaint, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that "leave shall be freely given
when justice so requires.'' Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). As the Utah Supreme Court has
recognized: "Courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to the end that cases may be
fully and fairly presented on their merits." Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 969 P.2d 403,
408 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted). It is within this framework that this Court should
review the Third District Court's Order denying Pride's Morion to Amend.
The Third District Court denied Pride's Motion to Amend on two primary theories:
(1) that the Motion was "untimely and that untimeliness has prejudiced Defendants"; and (2)
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that res judicata barred all amended Causes ofAction.12 (R. 1213). In determining that the
Motion was untimely the Third District Court stated:
This lawsuit was filed 12 years ago. All parties agree that the discovery was
completed in the early years of this lawsuit. Since the time of the filing and
completion of discovery, the person alleged to have been the principal
wrongdoer, L.L. Stroud, has died. Even though he testified in earlier
proceedings and was deposed, plaintiff has alleged new causes of action which
cannot now be explored. Additionally, while the federal court action may
have caused some delay in these proceedings, the federal lawsuit was
completed September 12, 2000. Plaintiff makes no explanation for the
fourteen month delay before it filed its Motion in the lawsuit.
(R. 1204-05). These determinations are not supported by the record. Thus, the Third District
Court's failure to grant Pride's Motion to Amend was an abuse of discretion.
In order to understand the nature of the Third District Court's error, this Court must
understand how Pride proposed to amend its Complaint. First, the Amended Complaint
restated Pride's First Cause ofAction, breach of contract. Pride Stable did not substantially
alter this Cause ofAction except to specify that it was based on part performance for which
the underlying facts had already been determined and for which the facts supporting such
breach of implied contract based upon part performance had already been pled in the original
Complaint. The Amended Complaint then added a Cause ofAction for promissory estoppel.
The Amended Complaint also collapsed two separate Causes ofAction for interference with
business relations into one claim for intentional interference with economic relations. The

12

Pride has already discussed the res judicata argument above. Accordingly,
Pride will focus its argument on the Third District Court's belief that the Motion was
untimely and defendants would be prejudiced by the amendment.
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Amended Complaint reiterated Causes of Action for breach of covenant of good faith and
fair dealing and fraud which were pled in the original Complaint. Thus, the only "new"
Cause ofAction was for promissory estoppel. There were no other "new" Causes of Action.
This is important because all allegations supporting the promissory estoppel Cause of Action
and the breach of implied contract based upon part performance were included in the original
Complaint.
Specifically, in its Complaint, Pride made the following allegations:
14.
On or about March 9, 1988, Plaintiff informed Defendants (other than
Valley) that, as a condition precedent to granting the permission requested by
said Defendants to build the said Golf Course on portions of Plaintiffs
property, Plaintiff needed sufficient funds to obtain the forbearance of Valley
and other secured creditors from foreclosure during a period of two years or
more during the construction of the golf course and pending the development
and sale of Plaintiff s properties adjoining the proposed golf course.
* # *

15.
During May and June of 1988, in reliance upon the representation of
Defendants (other than Valley) that the loan of $185,000 would be made
promptly, Plaintiff orally agreed with said Defendants to grant Homestead a
license to construct a large portion of its proposed golf course upon portions
of Plaintiff s properties in consideration of the said loan.
* * *

16.
Based upon the said oral agreements . . . and in partial performance of
said oral agreement, Plaintiffs' general partner executed a letter addressed to
Midway City, Utah in the form prepared and requested by said Defendants .
. . to assist him in obtaining a permit from the City of Midway for the
construction of the said golf course, and Defendants did in fact use that letter
to obtain a building permit and promptly thereafter began the construction of
the golf course.
* # *
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17. [Defendants have failed and refused to perform the oral agreement to
make the said loan and to execute the proposed written agreement and have
failed and refused to provide Plaintiff with any part of said loan save and
except for the sum of $5,000 which was advanced to Plaintiffs on or about
July 7, 1988.
* * *

18. Notwithstanding the aforesaid ... breach of the oral agreement by said
Defendants . . . Defendants proceeded to occupy portions of Plaintiffs' lands
and have entered into a series of contracts with third persons for construction
work and materials and have induced and directed third persons to enter upon
Plaintiffs' land and to construct substantial portions of Defendants' proposed
golf course on Plaintiffs' land and have cut down trees, removed topsoil,
created road, dug trenches, removed fences, re-contoured land, installed signs
and utilized the property for the storage and use of construction equipment and
materials. Said Defendants fraudulently induced Plaintiffs to take no
immediate legal action against such intrusions and use of Plaintiffs' property
by continuing to negotiate with Plaintiffs and by representing that their
promises would be performed, but in fact said Defendants did not intend to
perform the oral contract or to execute and perform the proposed written
contract.
* * *

19. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants . . . have occupied and used
large portions of Plaintiffs' properties without paying the agreed consideration,
have damaged the property and, by reason of withholding the promised funds,
have denied Plaintiff the ability to obtain a forbearance of its secured creditors
in order to preclude foreclosure of the deeds of trust applicable to Plaintiffs'
lands.
* * *

20. By reason of the foregoing Plaintiff was unable to provide its secured
creditors with consideration for the forbearance of their rights to foreclose and
Valley, despite its previous agreement to forebear if furnished consideration
from the funds to be loaned by Defendant to Plaintiff, has foreclosed and
purchased substantial portions of Plaintiff s property at foreclosure sales.
(R. 5-8). The foregoing allegations from the original Complaint are all that is needed to
support claims for breach of an implied contract based on part performance (the First Cause
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ofAction in the Amended Complaint) and promissory estoppel (the Second Cause of Action
in Hit Amended Complaint). Defendants were clearly aware of the allegations and complaints
made against them. The facts supporting these Causes ofAction were not different from the
facts alleged in the Complaint, and Defendants were not taken by surprise by any elements
of these Causes ofAction. The Amended Complaint merely added a Cause of Action based
upon factual allegations known to the parties since the inception of the lawsuit.
Under these circumstances, it was an abuse of discretion for the Third District Court
not to have granted Pride's Motion to Amend. As one court has stated "[djenial of leave to
amend is generally considered an abuse of discretion where the amendment merely seeks to
add a new legal theory supported by factual issues already in the case." Walls v. Arizona
Dept. ofPublic Safety, 826 P.2d 1217,1223 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (citing Caglev. Carr, 418
P.2d 381, 382-83 (Ariz. 1966)); see also Sherrardv. Stevens, 440 N.W.2d 2, 5 (Mich. Ct
App. 1989) (per curiam) (concluding motion to amend appropriately granted when Amended
Complaint did not add new factual allegations, "but merely claimed new types of damages
arising from the same set of factual allegations"). Further, "'[m] ere delay '-the mere fact that
the attempt to amend comes late-is not justification for denial of leave to amend.... 'Notice
and substantial prejudice to the opposing party are critical factors in determining whether an
amendment should be granted.'" Owen v. Superior Court of Arizona, 649 P.2d 278, 282
(Ariz. 1982) (quoting Hageman v. SignalL. P. Gas, Inc., 486 F.2d 479, 484 (6th Cir. 1973).
Pr: judice only occurs "when the amendment raises new issues or inserts new parties into the
litigation." Id. The reason for this was enunciated by the United State Supreme Court:
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If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a
proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim
on the merits. In the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as
undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the party of the movant, repeated
failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue
prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment,
futility of the amendment, etc.-the leave sought should, as the rales require,
be "freely given."
Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230 (1962).
Further, both the Federal and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure recognize that a party
is not prejudiced simply because a request to amend a Complaint comes late in the process.
In fact, both allow for amendments into and through trial, in that they allow a party to amend
its Complaint to conform to the evidence presented at trial. Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(b). Clearly, lateness alone is not justification for refusing to grant a Motion to
Amend. Taken together these cases and Rules dictate that a Motion to Amend a Complaint
should not be denied when it merely seeks to add a legal theory already supported by the
factual issues in a case or merely because it is late in a litigation. There must be some
prejudice to the defendant. In this case, the Third District Court incorrectly concluded tihat
Homestead would be prejudiced. As discussed, the Amended Complaint did not add any new
substantive factual allegations which were not included in the original Complaint. All
discovery has been conducted with those factual issues known to all parties. Pride has not
asked that discovery be continued to find evidence to support their claims, nor is it aware of
any discovery which would be needed regarding these claims. All applicable discovery
regarding these Causes of Action has already been completed.
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The "prejudice" relied upon by the Third District Court was the intervening death of
Stroud. However, the record is devoid of any evidence supporting the Third District Court's
determination that the death of L.L. Stroud and his inability to be deposed regarding the
"new" or restated Causes of Action prejudiced the Defendants. Mr. Stroud was repeatedly
deposed, both in the Federal Action and in the State Action, Mr. Stroud also testified in two
trials in the Federal Action. All of this discovery and trial testimony was conducted in
reference to the factual allegations pled by Pride in its original Complaint which states a
prima facie case of promissory estoppel and breach of implied contract based upon part
performance. Therefore, Defendants could not be prejudiced by the amendment because
they can present Mr. Stroud's deposition and prior trial testimony. See Utah R. Evid. 804
(b)(1) (allowing for use of testimony given in another hearing or proceeding if the party
against whom the testimony is offered or predecessor in interest had an opportunity and
similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross or redirect examination). Accord In
re: Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F.Supp. 1142 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (holding that deposition of
deceased physician was admissible in another lawsuit against defendant who attended
deposition and had opportunity, motive and intent to develop the physician's testimony).
This is even more true in the instant case because Pride's claims for breach of contract
and promissory estoppel are based upon the same facts set forth in the Complaint. See
Valdez Fisheries Development Ass'n, Inc. v. Alaska Pipeline Service Co., 45 P.3d 657 at 66667 (Alaska 2002) (concluding in essence that when claims are based on same facts discovery
concerning a promissory estoppel claim was same discovery that would be conducted into
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breach of contract claim); Planning and Design Solutions v. City of Santa Fe, 885 P.2d 628
at 636 (N.M. 1994) (concluding claims for promissory estoppel and breach of contract are
very similar). The only difference between these two theories of recovery is whether the
discussions and negotiations between the parties amounted to a bona fide contract or must
be enforced upon some equitable doctrine.
Simply put, there are no facts in the record which support the Third District Court's
conclusion that the Defendants would be prejudiced as a result of Pride's Amended
Complaint. Since it amounts to abuse of discretion to refuse a request to amend a Complaint
unless there is some prejudice to the defendants, this Court should reverse the Third District
Court's refusal to grant Pride's Motion to Amend and allow it to pursue its case to trial. Even
if this Court were to conclude that a court within its discretion could refuse to grant a Motion
to Amend based upon untimeliness without a showing of prejudice to Defendants, Pride's
Motion to Amend was timely. Pride readily admits that the claims in this lawsuit were not
actively litigated by either party during the 1990's. However, the reason for this inactivity
is because the parties tacitly agreed to a stand still arrangement in which they would
concentrate on pursuing only the claims involved in the Federal Action to determine if that
litigation could lead to a resolution between the parties, while not wasting resources on two
separate litigations. That is why there was no activity in this case in the years leading up to
2002.
The Third District Court also believed that the Motion was untimely because Pride
did not seek to amend its Complaint until approximately one year after the Federal Action
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ended. However, Pride needed time to re-evaluate its claims in light of the Tenth Circuit's
decision and to re-evaluate the efficacy of moving forward. Once this was done, Pride filed
its Motion to Amend, and at that time the case had not been set for trial. Defendants only
claim of prejudice is the death of L.L. Stroud. However, Mr. Stroud passed away before the
end of the Federal Action. Consequently, the additional one-year delay resulted in no
prejudice to Defendants.
Pride finds it ironic that while the Third District Court based its decision not to allow
Pride to amend its Complaint because of the delay following the end of the Federal Action,
it essentially allowed Defendants to amend their Answer to include a defense of res judicata.
Prior to their Memorandum in Opposition to Pride's Motion to Amend, Defendants never
raised the defense of res judicata. In fact, Defendants never even asked the Third District
Court for permission to amend, as did Pride. Homestead simply asserted res judicata in
response to Pride's Motion to Amend. Under such circumstances, it was an abuse of
discretion for the Third District Court to conclude that Pride's Motion to Amend was
untimely, while also concluding that Homestead timely raised the res judicata defense
despite the fact that Defendants never sought to amend their Answer in the months following
the Federal Action.13
13

Similarly, as discussed above, Defendants should have been judicially estopped
from raising res judicata as a defense and in opposition to Pride's Motion to Amend due
to the fact that Pride attempted to litigate all claims over all properties in the Federal
Action by way of Counterclaim, and Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Pride's
Counterclaim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Federal Bankruptcy Court
granted that Motion. "It is well settled that a party who has taken a position in a prior
37

For these reasons, the Third District Court abused its discretion in denying Pride's
Motion to Amend its Complaint. Pride should be allowed to amend its Complaint and
resolve the issues in this case on the merits.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the Third District Court's Order granting Homestead's
Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the doctrine of res judicata. This Court should
also issue an Order reversing the Third District Court's denial of Pride's Cross-Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and directing that partial summary judgment be entered as a
matter of law in favor of Pride on its Causes ofAction for breach of implied contract based
uj on part performance, promissory estoppel, and breach of implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, leaving only the issue of damages for trial on these claims. Finally, if
claims for implied contract and promissory estoppel are not included in Pride's original
Complaint, this Court should reverse the Third District Court's Order denying Pride's
Motion for Leave to Amend.

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
Due to the complexity of the issues presented in this case, Pride believes that oral
argument is necessary to aid the Court in reaching its decision.

litigation and has obtained relief on the basis of it cannot maintain the opposite position
in another action." Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491, 496 (Utah 1980).
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DATED this 17th day of Januaiy, 2003.
SUITTERAXLAND

r.
/^V
ichael W. Homer
Jesse C. Trentadue
Attorneys for Appellant/Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 17th day of January, 2003,1 caused two true and correct
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant Pride Stables to be served by first-class United
States mail, postage pre-paid, to:
Richard D. Burbidge, Esq.
Steven B. Mitchell, Esq.
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL

215 South State Street, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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ADDENDUM

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq. (#0492)
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq. (#2278)
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
Attorneys for Defendants
139 East South Temple, Suite 2001
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1103
(801)355-6677
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PRIDE STABLES, a Utah limited
partnership,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
HOMESTEAD GOLF CLUB, INC., et
al,

Civil No. 890907511 CV
Judge Sandra N. Peuler

Defendants.

The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Homestead Golf Club,
Inc. and Gerald R. Sanders, and Plaintiff Pride Stables' Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment, came on for hearing before the court, the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, Judge,
on July 2, 2002. Richard D. Burbidge of Burbidge & Mitchell appeared on behalf of
Defendants. Jesse Trentadue of Suitter Axland appeared on behalf of Plaintiff Pride
Stables. The court heard extensive argument of counsel and took the matter under
advisement.

The Court, having read and considered the papers filed in connection with the
motion and having heard the argument of counsel and being fully advised in the premises,
and having previously issued a Minute Entry granting Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment and denying Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that Summary Judgment shall be, and hereby is, entered dismissing
Plaintiffs Complaint on file herein including specifically the First, Seventh, Eighth and
Ninth Causes of Action, with prejudice and upon the merits. Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment is denied.
DATED this _^\

day of ^ ^ ( ~

2002.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing was mailed to
the following, postage prepaid, on the "2iirc&y of August, 2002:
Michael W. Homer, Esq.
Jesse Trentadue, Esq.
J. Rand Hirschi, Esq.
SUITTERAXLAND
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
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John G. Marshall, Esq.
MARSHALL & WILLIS
3945 Wasatch Blvd., #292
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
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Third Judicial District

MAY 13 2002
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq. (#0492)
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq. (#2278)
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
Attorneys for Defendants
139 East South Temple, Suite 2001
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1103
(801)355-6677
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PRIDE STABLES, a Utah limited
partnership,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

vs.
HOMESTEAD GOLF CLUB, INC.,
FRANK SHANNON, GERALD R.
SANDERS, L.L. STROUD, BRITT A.
MATHWICH, HENRY A. WEEKS,
MICHAEL J. HUNT, FARIDA, N.V., a
Netherlands Antilles Corporation,
GREAT INNS OF THE ROCKIES,
INC., a Nevada Corporation, VALLEY
BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, a
Utah banking corporation,
Defendants.

Civil No. 890907511 CV
Judge Sandra N. Peuler

Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File a First Amended Complaint came on for
hearing before the court, the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, Judge, on April 8, 2002. Jesse
C. Trentadue and Michael W. Homer of Suitter, Axland appeared on behalf of Plaintiff.
Richard D. Burbidge and Stephen B. Mitchell of Burbidge & Mitchell appeared on behalf
of Defendants. After having heard the argument of counsel, the court took the matter
under advisement.
The court now being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing
therefore and having issued its Minute Entry denying the motion, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that the Motion for Leave to File a First Amended Complaint shall be, and
the same hereby is, denied. The court determines that the motion is untimely and that the
untimeliness has prejudiced Defendants. Further, the decision of the United States Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Homestead Golf Club, Inc. v. Pride Stables, Case
No. 98-4211, is res judicata with respect to all of the proposed amended causes of action
and bars such claims. The Tenth Circuit ruled that no agreement for a loan existed
between Plaintiff and Homestead Golf Club, Inc. because there had never been a meeting
of the minds on the terms of the agreement and at best the parties' discussions had only
been an agreement to agree.
2

DATED this 1 3

day of

^AM

2002.
spy*

S"*"

BY THE COURT:

By \ G ' ) < ^ ^ g ( ^ u ^ £ ^ ^ ^ # ^
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing was mailed to
the following, postage prepaid, on the 3o

day of April, 2002:

Michael W. Homer, Esq.
Jesse Trentadue, Esq.
SUITTERAXLAND
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
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224 F.3d 1195
2000 CJ C.A.R. 5246
(Cite as: 224 F3d 1195)
United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit.
HOMESTEAD GOLF CLUB, INC., a Utah
corporation, Appellee and Cross-Appellant,
v.
PRIDE STABLES, a Utah limited partnership,
Appellant and Cross-Appellee,
v.
Valley Bank and Trust Company, Third-Party
Defendant.
Nos. 98-4211, 98-4217.

[2] Bankruptcy €==>3771
51k3771 Most Cited Cases
Determination by district court in breach of contract
action that no enforceable contract had existed
between parties could be appealed by defendant, as
it would collaterally estop defendant in his state
court action against plaintiff.
[3] Bankruptcy €^>3782
51k3782 Most Cited Cases
[3] Bankruptcy €=>3786
51k3786 Most Cited Cases

Sept 12,2000.
After owner of tracts of property located near
resort filed bankruptcy petition, corporation formed
for purposes of constructing golf course at resort
filed adversary proceeding seeking declaration that
it had right to use tracts for construction of golf
course, pursuant to agreement with owner. After
judgment for owner was reversed by District Court,
and subsequent judgment for corporation was also
reversed, the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Utah dismissed complaint. Appeal
was taken, and the United States District Court for
the District of Utah, Bruce S. Jenkins, J., affirmed.
Cross- appeals were taken. The Court of Appeals,
Lucero, Circuit Judge, held that purported oral
agreement between parties, under which owner
granted license allowing construction on its
property in exchange for loan allowing owner to
obtain forbearance from its secured creditors on one
of tracts, did not create an enforceable contract
under Utah law.
Affirmed.

When reviewing a district court's decision in its
capacity as bankruptcy appellate court, Court of
Appeals applies the clear error standard to findings
of fact, and the de novo standard to its conclusions
of law.
[4] Bankruptcy €=^3786
51k3786 Most Cited Cases
A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is without
factual support in the record, or if, after reviewing
all of the evidence, Court of Appeals is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made.
[5] Bankruptcy €^=>3786
51k3786 Most Cited Cases
It is especially important for Court of Appeals to be
faithful to the clearly erroneous standard when the
bankruptcy court's findings have been upheld by the
district court.
[6] Bankruptcy €=>3782
5 lk3782 Most Cited Cases

West Headnotes
[1] Bankruptcy €=>3771
51k3771 Most Cited Cases
While general rule is that a party cannot appeal
from a judgment in his favor, rule is not absolute,
and where a judgment gives the successful party
only part of that which he seeks and denies him the
balance, with the result that injustice has been done
him, he may appeal from the entire judgment.

[6] Contracts €=>29
95k29 Most Cited Cases
Under Utah law, the existence of a valid,
enforceable contract is a question of law, which is
reviewed for correctness.
[7] Contracts €=^28(1)
95k28(l) Most Cited Cases
Under Utah law, burden of proving the existence of
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a contract is on the party seeking enforcement of it.
[8] Contracts €=>9(1)
95k9(l) Most Cited Cases

contract, resort may be had to extraneous evidence
manifesting the intentions of the parties.
[12j Contracts €=>25
95k25 Most Cited Cases

[8] Contracts €==>32
95k32 Most Cited Cases
Purported oral agreement between corporation
organized for purposes of constructing golf course
on property adjacent to resort, and owner of nearby
tracts on which portion of course was to be built,
under which owner granted license allowing
construction on its property in exchange for loan
allowing owner to obtain forbearance from its
secured creditors on one of tracts, did not create an
enforceable contract under Utah law; important
material terms, such as funding date, interest rate,
and payment schedule were not determined, and it
was not e^en clear which property lease supported
proposed loan, and while parties had intended that
agreement be reduced to writing and executed, they
did not do so.

Under Utah law, if the parties intend to negotiate
further the terms of an agreement, a manifestation
of willingness to enter into the agreement is only
preliminary, and does not demonstrate the existence
of a binding contract.
[13] Bankruptcy €=>3779
51k3779 Most Cited Cases
[13] Federal Civil Procedure €=1939
170Akl939 Most Cited Cases
Pre-trial orders measure the dimensions of the
lawsuit, both in the trial court and on appeal.
[14] Contracts €=>9(1)
95k9(l) Most Cited Cases
Under Utah law, where a court cannot determine
what the rights of the parties would be under a
purported contractual agreement, it cannot enforce
that agreement.

[9] Contracts €=>9(1)
95k9(l) Most Cited Cases
[9] Contracts €=>15
95kl5 Most Cited Cases

[15] Bankruptcy €=?3779
51k3779 Most Cited Cases

Under Utah law, a condition precedent to the
enforcement of any contract is that there be a
meeting of the minds of the parties, which must be
spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with
sufficient definiteness to be enforced.

District court has the authority to affirm a
bankruptcy court's decision on an alternative ground
supported by the record.

[10] Contracts €=>15
95kl5 Most Cited Cases

[16] Estoppel C=?87
156k87 Most Cited Cases

Contractual mutual assent under Utah law requires
assent by all parties to the same thing in the same
sense so that their minds meet as to all the terms.

Under Utah law, detrimental reliance may allow a
remedy where no formal contract exists.
[17] Bankruptcy €=>3777
51k3777 Most Cited Cases

[11] Contracts €==>147(2)
95k 147(2) Most Cited Cases

Court of Appeals would not consider argument
which party utterly failed to support with legal
authority.

[11] Evidence €==>461(1)
157k461(l) Most Cited Cases
Under Utah law, the intentions of the parties to a
contract will normally be found from the instrument
itself, but where the parties did not execute a written
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim
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Under Utah law, conduct by one party which leads
another party, in reliance thereon, to adopt a course
of action resulting in detriment or damage if the
first party is permitted to repudiate his conduct may
constitute equitable estoppel.
[19] Estoppel €=>85
156k85 Most Cited Cases
[19] Estoppel €=>87
156k87 Most Cited Cases

LUCERO, Circuit Judge.
[1][2] After approximately ten years of litigation
regarding an oral agreement to construct a portion
of a golf course by plaintiff-appellee Homestead
Golf Club, Inc. ("HGC") on property owned by
defendant-appellant
Pride
Stables
("Pride"),
allegedly in exchange for a loan, the district court
decided that the parties had not created an
enforceable contract and dismissed the case.
Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
158(d) and 1291, we affirm. [FN1]

[19] Frauds, Statute Of €=>144
185kl44 Most Cited Cases
Under Utah law, a mere promise to execute a
written contract and a subsequent refusal to do so is
insufficient to create an estoppel, although reliance
is placed on such a promise and damage is sustained
as a consequence of the refusal.
[20] Estoppel €=^87
156k87 Most Cited Cases
Under Utah law, mere reliance by owner of tracts of
property located near resort on which golf course
was to be built on promise by corporation organized
for purposes of constructing course to execute
written contract memorializing oral agreement
between parties, under which owner granted license
allowing construction of course on its property in
exchange for loan allowing owner to obtain
forbearance from its secured creditors on one of
tracts, was insufficient to create an estoppel.
*1197 Stephen B. Mitchell (Richard D. Burbidge
with him on the briefs), Burbidge & Mitchell, Salt
Lake City, Utah, for the appellee and crossappellant.
John G. Marshall, Marshall & Willis, Salt Lake
City, Utah, for the appellant and cross-appellee.
Before LUCERO, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS,
Senior Circuit Judge, and ALLEY, Senior District
Judge. [FN*]

FN1. We requested supplemental briefing
on the question of whether Pride has
standing to appeal the order of the district
court when it prevailed on the merits.
"While it is the general rule that a party
cannot appeal from a judgment in his
favor, the rule is not absolute, and where a
judgment gives the successful party only
part of that which he seeks and denies him
the balance, with the result that injustice
has been done him, he may appeal from
the entire judgment." See J amis v.
Nobel/Sysco Food Sews. Co., 985 F.2d
1419, 1424 (10th Cir.1993) (quoting
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Barnes-Manley Wet
Wash Laundiy Co., 168 F.2d 381, 386
(10th Cir.1948)); cf. Lopez v. Behles (In
re American Ready Mix, Inc.), 14 F.3d
1497, 1500 (10th Cir.1994) (holding that
parties are "aggrieved" by a bankruptcy
court's decision "if the order ... diminishes
their property, increases their burdens, or
impairs their rights" (internal quotation
and citation omitted)). Because the
district court's decision that no valid
contract existed between the parties will
collaterally estop Pride in its state court
action against HGC, we conclude that
Pride is entitled to appeal the judgment of
the district court.

*1198I
FN* The Honorable Wayne E. Alley,
Senior District Judge, United States
District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma, sitting by designation.

HGC was organized to construct a golf course on
property adjacent to the Homestead Resort in
Midway, Utah. Pride owned a fifty-percent interest
in the property on which the fourteenth hole of the

Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

Page 4

224 F.3d 1195
2000 CJ C.A.R. 5246
(Cite as: 224 F.3d 1195)
golf course was to be built (the "fourteenth hole
property"), as well as a fifty-percent interest in other
property co-owned by Cal Clark on which other
portions of the golf course were to be constructed
(the "Clark-Pride property"). In 1987, HGC and
Pride began negotiating the construction of portions
of this golf course on Pride's property. By Spring
1988, however, Pride was in default on loans
secured by the Clark-Pride property from Valley
Bank & Trust Co. ("Valley Bank"), Davis County
Bank ("DCB"), and Crossland Savings & Loan
("Crossland") and was pursuing forbearance
agreements with some of these lenders to forestall
foreclosure proceedings.
On May 9, 1988, Pride purportedly granted an oral
license to allow HGC to construct the golf course
on portions of its property in exchange for a loan of
$185,000—an amount Pride needed to obtain
forbearance from its secured creditors on the
Clark-Pride property. Notably, the parties dispute
whether the loan related only to HGC's use of the
Clark-Pride property or whether it related to HGC's
use of both the Clark-Pride and fourteenth hole
properties.
Pending written documentation of this oral
agreement, Pride and the other property owners
signed a letter of commitment on June 15, 1988,
permitting HGC to begin construction of the golf
course on the fourteenth hole property. The letter
of commitment stated:
We ... give this letter of commitment to the City
of Midway ... for the purpose of issuing a
building permit to [HGC]. By this letter we
indicate our commitment to granting to [HGC] an
appropriate easement or license over the property
... for the purpose of their developing a golf
course in Midway, Utah. The underlying
agreements between the parties necessary to make
such a commitment have been reached in
principle and are awaiting final documentation,
which is expected to be prepared and signed
within the next two weeks. As such, we have no
objection to the granting of a construction permit
to [HGC] for the purpose of beginning
construction on the proposed golf course in
Midway, Utah.
(II Appellant's App. at 576.) During the next
month, the City of Midway granted the permit, and
HGC began construction. HGC also gave Pride's
General Partner, Robert Condie, a check in the

amount of $5,000 payable to Condie and Crossland.
Despite the letter of commitment, the parties were
unable to agree in writing on the terms of their oral
agreement. In August, Pride received a proposed
license agreement from HGC for the Clark-Pride
property and a promissory note for $185,000.
HGC prepared a separate license agreement for the
fourteenth hole property. Pride did not sign either
of the license agreements. In the face of threatened
foreclosure, Pride requested a modification of the
loan and its payment, but HGC alleges it would not
agree to the modifications unless Pride obtained
agreements from its lenders to subordinate their
loans to the license granted to HGC. Creditors
would not sign the subordination agreements, and
HGC refused to make the modified loans.
Seeking a declaration that it had the right to use the
fourteenth hole property, HGC filed this adversary
proceeding against Pride on April 28, 1989 in
bankruptcy court. Pride had filed a petition under
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in
May 1987, and a plan of reorganization had been
confirmed by the bankruptcy court in March 1988.
After trial on HGC's complaint, the bankruptcy
court entered judgment in favor of Pride. On
appeal, the district court reversed and remanded,
finding insufficient evidence in the record to
support the bankruptcy court's conclusion that HGC
*1199 had breached the May 9, 1988 agreement in
December of that year by failing to fund the
proposed loan.
On remand, the bankruptcy court entered judgment
for HGC, but on further appeal the district court
again remanded, this time for consideration of
"unresolved factual issues" that the bankruptcy
court had failed to address. [FN2] After an
evidentiary hearing, the bankruptcy court entered
judgment for Pride and dismissed HGC's complaint,
finding that HGC had anticipatorily repudiated the
parties' loan agreement in September 1988.
FN2.
Specifically, the district court
instructed the bankruptcy court to consider
whether HGC had repudiated the May 91
1988 agreement in September 1988.

On appeal for the third time, the district court

Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

Fage6of 10
224 F.3d 1195
2000 CJ C.A.R. 5246
(Cite as: 224 F.3d 1195)

Page 5

affirmed the bankruptcy court's dismissal of HGC's
complaint, but on alternative grounds. Without
reversing the determination of the bankruptcy court
that HGC had anticipatorily breached the
agreement, the district court held that dismissal of
HGC's complaint was required because no
enforceable contract existed. Pride filed a motion
to amend the judgment to alter the district court's
holding that the parties did not create an
enforceable contract, which the district court
denied. The parties filed cross-appeals from the
district court's judgment. [FN3]
FN3. HGC has also filed a Motion for
Leave to File Supplemental Appendix to
Reply Brief, which we grant.

n
[3][4][5][6][7] Reviewing a district court's decision
in its capacity as bankruptcy appellate court, we
apply the clear error standard to a bankruptcy
court's findings of fact and the de novo standard to
its conclusions of law. See Phillips v. White (In re
White), 25 F.3d 931, 933 (10th Cir.1994). "A
finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is without
factual support in the record or if, after reviewing
all of the evidence, we are left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made."
Conoco, Inc. v. Styler (In re Peterson Distrib., Inc.),
82 F.3d 956, 959 (10th Cir.1996). "It is especially
important to be faithful to the clearly erroneous
standard when the bankruptcy court's findings have
been upheld by the district court." Osborn v.
Durant Bank & Trust Co., 24 F.3d 1199, 1203
(10th Cir.1994). Under Utah law, the existence of
a valid, enforceable contract is a question of law
which we review for "correctness." John Deere Co.
v. A & H Equip., Inc., 876 P.2d 880, 883
(Utah.App. 1994); see also Herm Hughes & Sons,
Inc. v. Quintet, 834 P.2d 582, 583 (Utah
CtApp.1992). [FN4] "The burden of proving the
existence of a contract is on the party seeking
enforcement of it." Oberhansly v. Earle, 572 P.2d
1384, 1386 (Utah 1977) (citing B & R Supply Co. v.
Bringhurst, 28 Utah 2d 442, 503 P.2d 1216, 1217
(1972)).

FN4. Contrary to Pride's assertions, the
Copr. © West 2003 No <

district court did not violate the clear error
standard for review of the bankruptcy
court's factual findings by holding that the
May 9, 1988 agreement is unenforceable
because, as noted, whether an enforceable
contract exists is a question of law.

A
[8][9][10] The parties dispute whether their oral
agreement of May 9, 1988 is an enforceable
contract.
"A condition precedent
to the
enforcement of any contract is that there be a
meeting of the minds of the parties, which must be
spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with
sufficient definiteness to be enforced." [FN5]
Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P.2d 427,
428 (1961). "[Contractual mutual assent requires
assent by all parties to the same thing in the same
sense so that their minds meet as to all the terms."
Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 575 P.2d 1048, 1050
(Utah 1978); see also Sadder v. Savin, 897 P.2d
1217, 1220-22 (Utah 1995) (holding that to *1200
form an enforceable contract, there must be a
meeting of the minds on the essential terms of the
agreement).

FN5. Because a condition precedent to the
enforcement of an agreement is a finding
of fact that there was a meeting of the
minds sufficient to form an enforceable
contract, the district court's holding that no
enforceable contract existed is not, as
Pride contends, surplusage to its decision.
[11] Normally, the intentions of the parties "will be
found from the instrument itself," but where, as
here, the parties did not execute a written contract,
"resort may be had to extraneous evidence
manifesting the intentions of the parties."
Oberhansly, 572 P.2d at 1386. The focus of our
inquiry is the oral discussion on May 9, 1988,
during which Pride purportedly granted a license to
allow HGC to construct the golf course on portions
of Pride's property in exchange for a $185,000 loan.
Based on its examination of the evidence of the
oral agreement, the district court concluded that
"[i]mportant material terms such as the funding
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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date, interest rate, and payment schedule ... were not
determined at that time." (I Appellant's App. at
293.) Not only were important terms left open, but
it is not even clear which property lease supported
the proposed loan. HGC claims the loan related
only to the Clark-Pride property, but Pride alleges
the loan was supported by HGC's use of both the
Clark-Pride and the fourteenth hole properties. If
"there was simply some nebulous notion in the air
that a contract might be entered into in the future,
the court cannot fabricate the kind of a contract the
parties ought to have made and enforce it."
Valcarce, 362 P.2d at 428-29 (citation omitted).
We conclude this is the situation present here.

terms of the loan, including the interest rate, the
payback of the loan, and the purported use of the
funds to gain forbearance from foreclosure, were
discussed on May 9, 1988, as well as the
"dedication or use of [Pride's] property for the golf
course" as a "condition of that loan." (II
Appellant's App. at 382-85.) But this argument did
not make it onto the green because Condie also
testified that the "next step ... after that meeting"
was that "[t]he documents would be prepared to put
into writing the understanding." (Id. at 387.)

Because the parties did not ultimately memorialize
their oral agreement, we must inquire beyond the
verbal discussions into the attempts at written
documentation. The aforementioned letter of
commitment regarding the fourteenth hole property
was signed by Pride and stated in relevant part:
By this letter we indicate our commitment to
granting to [HGC] an appropriate easement or
license over the property.... The underlying
agreements between the parties necessary to make
such a commitment have been reached in
principle and are awaiting final documentation,
which is expected to be prepared and signed
within the next two weeks. As such, we have no
objection to the granting of a construction
permit....
(II Appellant's App. at 576.) In addition, as
detailed above, HGC prepared and sent to Pride a
license agreement and a promissory note in the
amount of $185,000 for the Clark-Pride property
and prepared a separate license agreement for the
fourteenth hole property. As we have noted, Pride
did not sign either of the license agreements. The
license agreements and the promissory note are of
limited value in determining the parties' intent
because they were never signed or executed.
Moreover, the letter of commitment did not specify
the terms of the oral agreement and stated explicitly
the parties' intent to document the details of their
arrangement in writing at a later time.

[12] If the parties intend to negotiate further the
terms of an agreement, a manifestation of
willingness to enter into the agreement is only
preliminary, and does not demonstrate the existence
of a binding contract. See Sackler, 897 P.2d at
1221-22. For example, in *1201Crismon v.
Western Co. of North America, 742 P.2d 1219,
1222 (Utah Ct.App. 1987), a letter indicated that
"the parties were still negotiating ... [, defendant's]
legal department would be sending a prepared
lease[, and] ... both parties understood that a
binding contract would be entered into in the
future." The parties then exchanged proposed
leases, which the Utah Court of Appeals held
"clearly demonstrates that they did not have a
meeting of the minds as to all of the essential terms
of the lease." Id. at 1222. In the instant case, the
letter of commitment evidences that same
intention—to prepare written documentation of the
parties' understanding which would then constitute
the binding contract. That intention was precisely
what the bankruptcy court found: "The parties
intended that their agreement be reduced to writing
and executed." (I Appellant's App. at 273.) HGC
drafted this documentation, but Pride did not sign it.
All that the parties consummated on May 9, 1988
was an agreement to agree, which is "unenforceable
because [it] leave[s] open material terms for future
consideration, and the courts cannot create these
terms for the parties." Harmon v. Greenwood, 596
P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 1979) (citing 17 Am.Jur.2d
362 Contracts § 26 (1991) (further citations
omitted)).

Conceding that no formal agreements "were ever
signed by the parties," Pride nevertheless asserts
that the missing material terms of the parties'
agreement were actually contained in the record on
appeal. (Appellant's Br. at 18.) Condie, who was
negotiating on behalf of Pride, testified that the

[ 13 ] [ 14] [ 15]
Notwithstanding
uncertainty
regarding the terms of the loan, Pride argues that
the terms of a contract are reasonably certain if they
provide a basis for determining the existence of a
breach and for giving an appropriate remedy. See
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33(2) (1979).
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But this argument lands Pride in a bunker: Like the
district court, we are at a loss to determine what that
remedy would be, because we are unable to
determine the rights of the respective parties under
the agreement. [FN6] As explained by the district
court, "[t]he record does not indicate which party
was to perform first ... [or] what the required
performance was: Did the agreement call for Pride
to sign the promissory note and obtain licenses
before the loan would be funded, as HGC suggests,
or was HGC to fund the loan first before obtaining
either the licenses or subordinations?" (I
Appellant's App. at 292.) Furthermore, the
complaint at issue sought a declaration of rights
pertaining to the fourteenth hole property, but the
parties dispute whether the oral loan agreement
related to that property or, as HGC contends,
related only to the Clark-Pride property. [FN7] We
will not speculate as to the parties' intentions
regarding a lease or easement for the fourteenth
hole property. Where, as here, we cannot determine
what the rights of the parties would be under an
agreement, we cannot enforce that agreement. [FN8]
See Oberhansly, 572 P.2d at 1387.
FN6. Pre-trial orders measure
the
dimensions of the lawsuit, both in the trial
court and on appeal. See American Home
Assurance Co. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 551
F.2d 804, 806 (10th Cir.1977). Pride
asserts for the first time in its reply brief
that we are bound by the parties'
stipulation in the pre-trial order that "[o]n
or about May 9, 1988[HGC] and [Pride]
orally agreed that [HGC] would lend
[Pride] the sum of $185,000 so that [Pride]
could make payment to certain of its
creditors." (I Appellant's App. at 183-84.)
The district court's holding that the oral
agreement is not sufficiently definite to
form a contract is not contrary to this
stipulation.
FN7. Because the scope of the complaint
and subsequent findings of the bankruptcy
court are limited to the fourteenth hole
property, we do not address whether the
parties entered mto an agreement or
contract relative to the Clark-Pride
property. Our decision therefore does not

preclude any pending or future actions
involving claims relevant only to the
Clark-Pride property.

FN8. Pride claims that it is entitled to a
finding of an enforceable contract pursuant
to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(c), which states in
relevant part that "every final judgment
shall grant the relief to which the party in
whose favor it is rendered is entitled."
This claim is without merit because the
district court has the authority to affirm the
bankruptcy
court's decision on an
alternative ground supported by the record.
See Sampson v. Sampson (In re Sampson),
997 F.2d 717, 721 (10th Cir.1993).
Likewise, Pride's reliance in its reply brief
on Brown v. Gurney, 201 U.S. 184, 190,
26 S.Ct. 509, 50 L.Ed. 717 (1906), is
misplaced. The Supreme Court in Brown
held that "where the existence of certain
facts is assumed in the trial court and the
trial proceeds, without objection, on that
assumption, and the case is decided in
reliance thereon, neither party will be
heard in the court of review to question ...
the existence of the facts." However, the
instant case is distinguishable because
whether the agreement constitutes an
enforceable contract is a question of law,
not of fact.

*1202 B
[16] Pride would have us ignore the missing
elements in its documentation that make the
contract unenforceable by arguing that it fully
performed in allowing HGC to construct its golf
course, but that HGC refused to fund the loan
knowing that failure to do so could result in
foreclosure on Pride's property. According to
Pride, allowing HGC to retain the benefit of the
bargain, while denying Pride the opportunity to
recover the damages it incurred due to HGC's
breach of the agreement on the grounds of
indefiniteness, would be inequitable. [FN9]

FN9. We do not address the merits of
Pride's reply brief contention that it is
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entitled to relief pursuant to the doctrines
enunciated in Restatement (Second) of
Contracts §§ 34 and 69(2) (1979). See
Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Trust, 99 A F.2d
716, 724 (10th Cir.1993) (holding that
issues raised for the first time in the reply
brief will not be considered). Ordinarily,
detrimental reliance might allow a remedy
where no formal contract exists, or,
alternatively, partial performance such as
occurred here might support a finding of
an enforceable contract. See Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 34 (1979). Pride,
however, did not advance arguments based
on these theories until its reply brief,
although it did place in play the doctrinally
independent concept of equitable estoppel.

[17] Pride tees its argument on 17 Am.Jur.2d
Contracts § 193(1991):
The determination that an agreement is
sufficiently definite is favored. Rejection of a
contract for indefiniteness is, at best, a last resort.
Therefore, courts will, if possible, so construe the
agreement as to carry into effect the reasonable
intention of the parties, if that can be ascertained.
In other words, in interpreting doubtful
agreements a court will, if possible, attach a
sufficiently definite meaning to a bargain of
parties who evidently intended to enter into a
binding contract. The law leans against the
destruction
of
contracts
for
uncertainty,
particularly where one of the parties has
performed part of the contract.
Pride contends that even if the oral agreement in
its original conception was unenforceable, the fact
that HGC acted on this agreement by constructing
the golf course, in addition to fronting Pride Stables
$5,000 of the agreed-on $185,000 loan, constitutes
an acceptance of the bargain. [FN 10]
FN 10. As an alternative basis for finding
injury, Pride argues that Lem Stroud, who
negotiated on behalf of HGC, admitted that
he had a fiduciary duty and made
representations to Pride that if it would
contribute its property, it would be
"morally, legally and otherwise protected
in their dealings." (Appellant's Br. at 17
(citing Appellant's App. at 333-34).) We

donot consider this argument because
Pride has utterly failed to support it with
legal authority. See Phillips v. Calhoun,
956 F.2d 949, 953-54 (10th Cir.1992)
(holding that a party must support its
argument with legal authority).
[18][19][20] It is true that HGC began construction
of the course in June 1988 and gave Condie a check
in the amount of $5,000 payable to Condie and
Crossland the following month. It is also true that
"conduct by one party which leads another party, in
reliance thereon, to adopt a course of action
resulting in detriment or damage if the first party is
permitted to repudiate his conduct" may constitute
equitable estoppel. Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins.
Co., 699 P.2d 688, 691 (Utah 1985). But Pride
fails to drive the point home, because "a mere
promise to execute a written contract and a
subsequent refusal to do so is insufficient to create
an estoppel, although reliance is placed on such a
promise and damage is sustained as a consequence
of the refusal." F.C. Stangl, III v. Ernst Home Ctr.,
Inc., 948 P.2d 356, 365 (Utah Ct.App.1997)
(quoting McKinnon v. The Corp. of the President of
the Church of Jesus Chnst of Latter-Day Saints,
529 P.2d 434, 436-37 (Utah 1974)). Pride merely
relied on HGC's promise to execute a written
contract, which is insufficient to create an estoppel.
*1203 C
In its conclusion, the district court stated: "It
appears that the loan agreement, as contemplated byj
the parties, more closely resembled a Monet—an
impressionist rendering fashioned as the thoughts
occurred to them—rather than a Manet of detailed
execution." (I Appellant's App. Doc. 19 at 11)
(citing United States v. Cropper, 42 F.3d 755, 759
(2d Cir.1994).) But it is the surreal nature of the
parties' conduct that we find remarkable. As noted
by the district court, "[w]hy any business would
begin developing a golf course on land it had no
ownership interest in, without first securing written
permission to use the land on terms that required a
definite performance and secured that interest, is
beyond the comprehension of this Court." (1
Appellant's App. Doc. 19 at 8.) We fault the district
court only in its choice of artistic metaphor—
Impressionism
rather
than
Surrealism-but
otherwise take its view of the matter.
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VIII
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
224 F.3d 1195, 2000 CJ C.A.R. 5246
END OF DOCUMENT
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